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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

At the time of writing these lines the revenue act of 1921 is rapidly
nearing completion and our attention undoubtedly will be centered upon it
to the exclusion of rulings with reference to the former tax laws. How
ever, it is quite essential to keep one’s self informed upon these older
laws, as for several years to come their provisions will be the subject of
much and painstaking consideration.
This month’s quota of treasury decisions, because they treat of subjects
that are quite thoroughly understood, do not appear to have the general
interest that former decisions have had, but there is one, No. 3240, defining
the rules for reopening cases before the department of internal revenue,
that should be given more than a cursory reading. These rules will
undoubtedly act as a deterrent to those whose differences with the depart
ment of internal revenue are based on vague contentions and they will
also be of value to those who have had claims denied because all the facts
have not been presented.
We are presenting this month a recommendation of committee on
appeals and review, which while quite voluminous treats of a matter upon
which counsel is often sought by taxpayers. This opinion quite definitely
defines what conditions must be present if a taxpayer can be considered
an “officer or employee of a state or a political subdivision thereof.” This
question presents itself with considerable frequency to those who set out
to give others advice and assistance in federal income-tax matters. It
has been difficult, at least for the writer, to convince some who had
rendered services for a state, county, city or township, that their particular
services did not constitute them an employee of such political subdivision
under the true intent of the provisions exempting from taxation compen
sation from such employment. Henceforth this question will be easily
solved as long as this opinion and recommendation are not successfully
attacked.
(T. D. 3225—September 6, 1921.)
Estate tax—Revenue act of 1916—Decision of court.
1. Gross Estate—Joint Property.
Property in which decedent was interested jointly with any other person,
and all of which was originally his, must be included as a part of the
gross estate under section 202, subdivision (c), revenue act of 1916, pro
viding that the value of the gross estate of decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property to the extent
of the interest therein “held jointly * * * by the decedent and any
other person * * * except such part thereof as may be shown to have
originally belonged to such other person and never to have belonged to
decedent”; the word “originally” in the statute refers to the time the
joint interest was created, and the words “never to have belonged to the
decedent” mean at any time before the creation of the joint estate.
2. Constitutionality of Act—Excise Tax.
The act takes effect upon the death of decedent; it does not become
retroactive because it measures the tax payable by the estate in part by
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property which decedent has given away in his lifetime; it is an excise tax
on the privilege of disposing of property by will or intestacy, and is not
a direct tax on property within the meaning of article I, section 9, clause 4
of the constitution.
The appended decision of the United States circuit court of appeals
for the second circuit, in the case of Richard J. McElligott, former col
lector, v. Cornelia B. Kissam and John C. Knox, is published for the
information of internal revenue officers and others concerned.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Richard J. McElligott, as late acting collector of internal revenue for the
third district of New York, plaintiff in error, defendant below v. Cornelia
B. Kissam and John C. Knox, as executrix and executor of the last will
and testament of Jonas B. Kissam, deceased, and said Cornelia B. Kissam,
individually and as sole beneficiary under said last will and testament,
defendants in error, plaintiffs below.

Before Henry Galbraith Ward, Henry Wade Rogers and Martin T.
Manton, Circuit Judges.
Ward, Circuit Judge: July 15, 1912, Jonas B. Kissam assigned 10 certain
bonds and mortgages of individuals and certain bonds of corporations
owned by him to John C. Knox, and subsequently Knox assigned them to
Jonas B. Kissam and his wife Cornelia. In the instruments of assignment
Knox as party of the first part assigned the bonds and mortgages—
to the party of the second part, their survivor, such survivors, executors,
administrators and assigns
and to hold—
to the party of the second part, the survivor of them and to the successors,
personal representatives and assigns of the said party of the second part
forever;
and it was further stated that—
It is the intention of this assignment that the survivor of the said Jonas B.
Kissam and Cornelia B. Kissam shall become the absolute owner of said
bond and mortgage and that neither the said Jonas B. Kissam nor the
said Cornelia B. Kissam shall have power to affect the right of the survivor
thereto.
The instrument of assignment of the corporate bonds contained the
same provisions.
All parties concede that the ownership was at least joint and that it
could have been severed and turned into a tenancy in common by either
party notwithstanding the reservation that neither party could affect the
right of the survivor.
June 2, 1917, Kissam died, leaving all his estate to his wife Cornelia,
she and John C. Knox being executors of the will.
The act of September 8, 1916, known as the estate-tax law, as amended
by the act of March 3, 1917, provides:
Sec. 201. That a tax (hereinafter in this title referred to as the tax)
equal to the following percentages of the value of the net estate, to be
determined as provided in section two hundred and three, is hereby imposed
upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent dying after the
passage of this act, whether a resident or nonresident of the United States:
One per centum of the amount of each net estate not in excess of
$50,000; * * *
Sec. 202. That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be
determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property,
real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated:
(a) To the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time
of his death which after his death is subject to the payment of the charges
against his estate and the expenses of its administration and is subject to
distribution as part of his estate.
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(b) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has created a trust,
in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after his death, except in case of a bona fide sale for a fair consid
eration in money or money’s worth, * * *.
(c) To the extent of the interest therein held jointly or as tenants in the
entirety by the decedent and any other person, or deposited in banks or
other institutions in their joint names and payable to either or the survivor,
except such part thereof as may be shown io have originally belonged
to such other person and never to have belonged to the decedent, * * *.
Sec. 203. That for the purpose of the tax the value of the net estate
shall be determined—
(a) In the case of a resident, by deducting from the value of the gross
estate—
(1) Such amounts for funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims
against the estate, unpaid mortgages, losses incurred during the settlement
of the estate arising from fires, storms, shipwreck, or other casualty, and
from theft, when such losses are not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise, support during the settlement of the estate of those dependent
upon the decedent, and such other charges against the estate, as are allowed
by the laws of the jurisdiction, whether within or without the United States,
under which the estate is being administered; and
(a) An exemption of $50,000, * * *
The executors included in their return to the commissioner of internal
revenue one-half of said joint property in the decedent’s gross estate as
being his property and paid the transfer tax on the net estate so ascer
tained, but the commissioner reviewed their return and included the whole
of the joint property in the gross estate and assessed the net estate returned
in this way.
The executors paid the additional tax under protest and after unsuc
cessfully seeking to obtain a refund brought this action, the complaint
containing four causes of action, of which the first involved the considera
tions above mentioned. They claimed that the assessment was void as to
the half of the joint property which vested in Cornelia before the passage
of the act of September 8, 1916, as amended, and also that the act itself
was unconstitutional as a direct tax upon property without apportionment
among the several states as required by article I, section 9, subdivision 4,
of the constitution.
The executors moved for judgment on the first cause of action, which
motion the district court granted and the collector has sued out this writ
of error.
We point out in the first place that the practice pursued was wholly
erroneous. What has become of the three causes of action as to which
there was no answer or demurrer? Judgment should have been entered
in favor of the executors on the merits of the first cause of action, and
by default upon the second, third and fourth causes of action. Actions at
law can not be brought up in the federal courts by writ of error piece
meal; the whole controversy must be settled in one final judgment. As the
judgment will be reversed, the whole controversy can be disposed of upon
a new trial.
The joint property mentioned in section 202, subdivision c, is included
as a measure of the tax payable by the estate for the decedent’s privilege
of disposing of his property by will or intestacy. It is an excise tax and
not a direct tax upon property—New York Trust Co. v. Eisner (263 Fed.,
620); Prentiss v. Eisner (260 Fed., 589; 267 Fed., 16). The language of
the subdivision plainly applies to property in which the decedent was
interested jointly with any other person, and all of which was originally
his; i. e., any part of the property which originally belonged to such other
person and never at any time belonged to the decedents is not to be
included. The expression “originally” refers not to the time of death,
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but to the time the joint interest was created. So the words “never to
have belonged to the decedent” mean at any time before the creation of
the joint estate. The act takes effect upon the death; it does not become
retroactive because it measures a transfer tax payable by the estate in
part by property which the decedent has given away in his lifetime. This
seems to us perfectly fair, and an answer to the constitutional objection.
Judgment reversed.
(T. D. 3232—September 28—1921.)
Income taxes—Act of October 3,1913—Decision of court.
1. Dividends—Income—Assets Sold for Stock in New Corporation.
Where an oil company owning pipe line and oil properties caused the
organization of a pipe-line company to which it contracted to convey its
pipe-line property, in consideration of which the pipe-line company promised
to distribute its stock to the stockholders of the oil company in the same
proportion as their existing holdings, the pipe-line property representing
a surplus above the par value of the oil company’s stock, the shares of the
pipe-line company received by the oil company stockholders in carrying out
the contract constituted gross income for the year in which the shares
were issued.
2. Same.
Where an oil company owning pipe line and oil properties caused the
organization of a pipe-line company to which it made a contract to convey
its pipe-line property, in consideration of which the pipe-line company
promised to transfer its stock to the oil company, and the resolution of
the oil company directors which accepted the contract declared as a divi
dend all the shares to be received from the pipe-line company and directed
them to be distributed among its stockholders in accordance with their
existing holdings, and the pipe-line property represented a surplus above
the par value of the oil company stock, the shares of the pipe-line com
pany received in carrying out the contract constituted gross income of
the oil company stockholders for the year in which the shares were issued.
The appended decision of the United States district court for the
southern district of New York, rendered August 3, 1921, in the cases of
New York Trust Co. et al. v. Edwards, collector, and United States v.
John D. Rockefeller, is published for the information of internal revenue
officers and others concerned.
United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
New York Trust Co. et al., as executors of William L. Harkness, v. William
H. Edwards, collector, and United States v. John D. Rockefeller.
[Aug. 3, 1921.]
These cases involve the legality of the income tax levied upon the
plaintiff in the Harkness case and the. defendant in the Rockefeller case.
The question turns on the effect of certain corporate actions taken by the
Prairie Oil & Gas Co. and the Ohio Oil Co. during the winter of 1914-15.
The Prairie Oil & Gas Co. was the owner of pipe-line property and
oil property and, for reasons not here relevant, felt itself forced to separate
these two into separate corporations. In pursuance of that purpose it caused
a corporation to be organized known as the Prairie Pipe Line Co. It
then made a contract with the pipe-line company by which it was to convey
all its pipe-line property to it, in consideration of which the pipe-line com
pany promised to distribute all its own stock to the stockholders of the
oil company in the same proportion as their existing holdings. This was
carried out, and the shares of the pipe-line company so received by Harkness
and Rockefeller were taxed as part of their income for the year in which
the shares were issued.
The transaction in the case of the Ohio Oil Co. was similar except
that the agreement between it and the Illinois Pipe Line Co., which it
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organized, required the shares to be transferred direct to the oil company.
However, the resolution of the directors of the oil company which accepted
the contract declared as a dividend all the shares to be received from the
pipe-line company and directed them to be distributed among its stock
holders in accordance with their existing holdings. This agreement was
carried out as well, and the shares so declared were also taxed as income
against Harkness and Rockefeller as in the case of the Prairie Oil &
Gas Co. In both cases the pipe-line properties represented a surplus above
the par value of the oil companies’ stock; the conveyances therefore left
the oil companies’ capital unimpaired and required no reduction in their
authorized issues.
Learned Hand, District Judge: Neither the Prairie Gas & Oil Co. nor
the Ohio Oil Co. for any moment of time owned the pipe-line shares as
free assets. This is very clear in the case of the Prairie Co., the trans
action in which—observing now the most scrupulous formality—was this:
The pipe-line company offered to buy the oil company’s pipe-line assets
for $27,000,000—adjusted to actual values—and to give in payment its own
shares to be directly distributed by the pipe-line company pro rata among
the oil company’s stockholders. This offer the oil company accepted, and
the contract of January 21, 1915, bound the buyer so to distribute the stock,
which it did. This was a contract made for the sole benefit of the oil com
pany’s stockholders and could probably have been directly enforced by
them at law—Hendrick v. Lindsay (93 U. S. 143) ; National Bank v. Grand
Lodge (98 U. S. 123, 124 [semble]). Yet it was the only contract by
which the oil company ever got any conceivable interest in the pipe-line
shares, and it gave that company no such interest. It had given away its
property for a consideration moving directly to third persons.
In the case of the. Ohio Co., formally the contract bound the pipe-line
company to deliver its shares to the oil company and they thus would
have become free assets, if there had been nothing more. However, in
the very resolution of the oil company’s board of directors by which the
offer of the pipe-line company was accepted the board declared a pro rata
distribution of the pipe-line shares among its own stockholders. Thus as
the moment of concluding the contract by which alone the oil company
got any interest in the shares, the property so acquired was declared as a
dividend. That declaration gave the stockholders of the oil company an
immediate vested right to the dividend so declared—Staats v. Biograph Co.
(235 Fed. 454 [C. C. A. 2nd]) ; Hopper v. Sage (112 N. Y. 530) ; Reynolds
v. Diamond Mills Paper Co. (69 N. J. Eq. 299, 300).
Therefore, I think that Peabody v. Eisner (247 U. S. 347) does not
apply. I agree that had these shares been once free treasury assets it
would be impossible to distinguish that case; the dividend would have been
declared in specific property. But since the shares even in the case of the
Ohio Co. were always the property of the stockholders the transactions
must be taken as a whole, and the case determined from their effect
upon the rights of the stockholders.
A dividend may be income to the stockholder though declared out of
property which has long since become a part of the economic capital of
the corporation—Peabody v. Eisner, supra; Lynch v. Hornby (247 U. S.
339). True, it must not be a dividend in liquidation (Lynch v. Turrish,
247 U. S. 221), and perhaps it must on that account be from a corporate
surplus, since otherwise it is hard to avoid regarding it as in liquidation.
But it makes no difference that it distributes to the stockholder property
which is not current profit, but the means of producing current profit. He
must still pay an income tax upon it, though in his eyes it is a part of
his capital. Therefore, in the cases at bar the only question is of the
completeness of severance of the property declared, i. e., the control of it
acquired by the stockholder and lost by the corporation.
In Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S. 189) the case was of a mere stock
dividend, which was held to be no more than new evidence of the stock
holder’s original ownership. Had the shares been without par value, that
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would have been literally the case, but they were not. The stock dividend
did change the relation of the corporation and the stockholder to the
surplus, by permanently impounding it, as it were, in the business, and
giving the stockholder a right to insist upon it as an investment, should
his fellows later wish to realize it as profit. Yet, though he thus got,
and the corporation lost, this element of control over the surplus so
declared, it was not regarded as a severance of the property. So far,
therefore, Eisner v. Macomber, supra, helps the taxpayers here; it shows
that there may be some changes in the relation of the stockholders to the
surplus which do not amount to the severance of income.
Nevertheless, the cases at bar go further than that case because in them
the surplus was transferred to a new corporation altogether, and the question
is whether that distinction changes the result. The taxpayers insist that
if one looks at the very truth of the matter, disregarding corporate forms,
this is no difference at all. Although the argument is plausible, it still
seems to me that, even when viewed with the completest disregard of
forms, the pipe-line properties were completely severed from the oil com
panies and that the resulting shares were new property derived from the
old shares.
A corporation, stripped of its fictitious personality, is an association of
persons mutually agreed upon the execution of more or less definitely
expressed purposes, publicly registered as the law requires. In the case
of industrial corporations the personnel of the membership is an imma
terial matter; the original members leave as they please and their substi
tutes enter merely by purchase. Even the number of members changes
from time to time. If so, it is the common purposes and their execution
alone that determine the corporation and whatever substantially changes
these changes the corporation itself and the rights of its stockholders.
The result of the conveyance of the pipe-line property was to put it
under the control of an association committed exclusively to its operation
as a separate enterprise from that of the oil company. Indeed, this sever
ance in management was the sole motive of the transaction, unless there
were a surreptitious agreement between the two groups which nullified the
dissolution, which is not suggested. Accepting, therefore, the taxpayers’
argument that forms should be disregarded, the question is whether a
group mutually agreeing to manage the pipe-line property independently
of the oil property is a different group from one agreeing to manage the
pipe line and the oil property jointly. If the association does not depend
upon the number or make-up of its membership but upon its charter,
there can be no question that the difference between the two is substantial,
because to conduct two businesses as a unity has practical results very
different from conducting them in complete independence.
For illustration, let me assume that the pipe-line property had been
conveyed in specie to the stockholders as coöwners and that they had
incorporated for convenience. The original conveyance to them would
have fallen directly within Peabody v. Eisner, supra, and Lynch v. Hornby,
supra. It would have made no difference that they had later incorporated.
Yet judged by results, this is exactly what happened: the pipe line was
broken from an association committed to its joint management with the
oil properties and consigned to an association which must manage it alone.
Or suppose that the Prairie Pipe Line Co., for example, had been a
going concern with property of its own. Upon its acquisition of the pipe
line and the issue of its new shares to the oil company stockholders they
would have an interest in an association operating two properties. These
new shares would certainly be income in their hands to some .extent.
Would they be altogether income or only in the proportion to which by
taking the new shares they gave up their rights in the old pipe line and
got in exchange an interest in the original property of the Prairie Pipe
Line Co.? I scarcely think that anyone would urge that the new shares
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were not altogether income. Yet, if so, they would become such only
because the pipe line was being conducted in a new joint enterprise by the
Prairie Pipe Line Co. Unquestionably the oil company stockholders would
to some extent be still holding their old pipe lines and in the same rela
tive proportions.
Or consider again the analogy of many of the dissolutions under the
Sherman act. These consisted in no greater separation than was accom
plished here, yet it was thought enough to serve the enterprise and create
new rights in the new corporations. Nor was it thought to be an answer
that the stockholders started out the same. Because the members might
join or leave the new group which conducted only a part of the old busi
ness, it was considered that the old group was effectively broken up.
Disregarding, therefore, all formalities, it appears to me that the pipe
line properties were as effectually severed from the old corporations as
though they had been distributed in kind. Indeed, the form adopted was
the only practicable way in which they could be so distributed. It is only
when one fastens one’s attention upon the momentary identity of the two
resulting groups that there can be any question of the result. But, as I
have perhaps too often said, that identity is nothing unless its continuance
is insured for the future by some common agreement between the two.
I think that the new shares were income under the law and that the tax
was legal.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe (247 U. S. 330) is not to the contrary;
there the assets taken over had always been in the actual possession and
under the control of the corporation. All the shares of the subsidiary
were owned by it and the two were treated as merged. Nothing of the
sort is true in the cases at bar. In Gulf Oil Co. v. Lewellyn (248 U. S. 71)
it is indeed true that the property of the subsidiaries was not in the posses
sion of the parent corporation, but it owned all their shares, and they
were dll “a single enterprise,” controlled by it. In no sense did the
pipe-line companies and the oil companies here remain in “a single enter
prise.” They might in fact be so conducted for a period, but if so it
would only be by the spontaneous assent of two independent groups of
persons. If they remained in fact “a single enterprise,” the whole plan
was a mere cover.
Phellis v. United States (Court of Claims, March, 1921) was a case
where all the assets were sold to another corporation, which—omitting
irrelevant details—gave its own shares, two for one, to the old stockholders
and conveyed its debenture shares to the old company par for par. The
result was that the old stockholders had their old shares now represented
by the assets of the old corporation, i. e., the debenture shares in the
new corporation, and double their original holdings in common shares
of the new corporation. Whatever may be the proper answer to the case,
with the greatest deference I can not follow the reasoning of the learned
judge, now urged upon me as authoritative. That reasoning is that because
as that of the old shares before, there can have been no income to the
stockholder. It may, of course, happen that in the case of the distribution
of the dividends the value of the old shares does not fall as much as the
value of the dividend, though generally the correspondence is pretty close.
It does not make any difference for taxing purposes whether it does or
not. The surplus declared as dividend may or may not be represented in
the value of the shares, but even though it be fully represented, the divi
dend becomes income as soon as the stockholder gets it. On his books
it may appear as a capital distribution, depending on whether he carries
his investment at par. That is not to the point. It was not his property
before; it has become such by the declaration of the dividend.
Demurrers sustained; judgment absolute on the demurrers, dismissing
Harkness’s complaint and awarding recovery against Rockefeller as prayed.

. 460

Income-tax Department
(T. D. 3235—October 6, 1921.)
War-profits and excess-profits tax.
Articles 912 and 913, Regulations No. 45 (1920 ed.), amended.
Articles 912 and 913, Regulations No. 45 (1920 ed.), are hereby amended
to read as follows:
Art. 912. Determination of first instalment of tax in special cases.—In
the case of any corporation, other than a foreign corporation, where abso
lutely no data are available for the determination of invested capital for
the taxable year, the instalments of the tax shall in the first instance be
determined upon the basis of a war-profits and excess-profits tax equal
to 50 per cent. of the net income, except that for 1919 and subsequent
taxable years, in the case of any corporation other than a foreign corpora
tion, such instalments shall be determined upon the basis of an excess
profits tax equal to 20 per cent. of the net income in excess of $3,000, but
not in excess of $20,000, plus 40 per cent. of the net income in excess of
$20,000. In any other case under section 328 of the statute, other than the
case of a foreign corporation, but including a case where the invested
capital for the taxable year can not be accurately determined, but where
a minimum amount of invested capital, as to which there is no question,
can be determined, the instalments shall in the first instance be determined
upon the basis of a war-profits and excess-profits tax computed by using
the minimum invested capital, the tax in any such case not to exceed an
amount equal to 50 per cent. of the net income, and for 1919 and subsequent
taxable years not to exceed 20 per cent. of the net income in excess of
$3,000, but not in excess of $20,000, plus 40 per cent. of the net income
in excess of $20,000.
Art. 913. Determination of first instalment of tax in the case of foreign
corporation.—In the case of a foreign corporation the instalments of the
tax shall in the first instance be determined upon the basis of a war-profits
and excess-profits tax computed by using its invested capital for the tax
able year 1917, such tax for any taxable year not to exceed an amount
equal to 50 per cent. of the net income, and for 1919 and subsequent tax
able years not to exceed 20 per cent. of the net income not in excess of
$20,000, plus 40 per cent. of the net income in excess of $20,000. For the
purpose of this article the invested capital for 1917 shall be adjusted for
any subsequent changes in its amount due to cash or property paid in or
withdrawn or to surplus or undivided profits of prior years retained in the
business and property attributable to its business within the United States.
If the tax for 1917 was determined under section 210 of the revenue act
of 1917, the constructive capital which would result in a tax equivalent to
the tax determined under that section shall be used. In the case of a
foreign corporation which was organized subsequent to the taxable year
1917, or which had no income from sources within the United States
during 1917, the instalments of the tax shall in the first instance be deter
mined upon the basis of a war-profits and excess-profits tax equal to
50 per cent. of the net income, except that for 1919 and subsequent tax
able years such instalments shall be determined upon the basis of an
excess-profits tax equal to 20 per cent. of the net income not in excess of
$20,000, plus 40 per cent. of the net income in excess of $20,000.

(T. D. 3238—October 22, 1921.)
Income tax.
Article 1547, Regulations No. 45, amended.
There shall be added at the end of article 1547 of Regulations No. 45,
as amended by T. D. 3206, a new paragraph to read as follows:
(4) Where the stock with respect to which a stock dividend is declared
was purchased at different times and at different prices, and the identity
of the lots can or can not be determined, but the dividend stock issued with
respect to such stock can not be identified as having been issued with respect
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to any particular lot of such stock, then any sale of such dividend stock
will be presumed to have been made from the stock issued with respect
to the earliest purchased stock, the amount of the stock dividend charge
able to such stock.
(T. D. 3240—October 31, 1921.)
Reopening of cases.
Where any case in the bureau of internal revenue has been finally
closed after the taxpayer, or other party thereto, has had a hearing or
has been afforded by written notice an opportunity to present oral or
written arguments or statements of fact in support of his contentions, the
case will not be reopened except (1) where a showing is made of new
and material facts, accompanied by an explanation, satisfactory to the
commissioner of internal revenue, of the failure to produce such facts
prior to the closing of the case, or (2) where the case is materially
affected by the change of regulations or by the final decision of another
case either by the commissioner of internal revenue or by a court of com
petent jurisdiction. The application for reopening a case should be ad
dressed to the commissioner of internal revenue, should state succinctly
the facts and circumstances upon which the application is based, and must
be supported by the affidavit of a person having knowledge of the facts.
This decision is not to be construed as modifying the regulations relating
to the filing of claims in abatement or claims for refund, nor as denying
the right of a taxpayer to a hearing or to an appeal at any stage of his
case until the case has been finally closed. After the taxpayer has ex
hausted his remedies within the bureau, however, and the case has been
finally closed, it will be reopened only under the conditions stated in the
decision.
(T. D. 3241—November 1, 1921.)
Estate tax.
Deductions under paragraph (3) of subdivisions (a) and (z) of section 403,
revenue act of 1918—Article 56, Regulations No. 37, amended.
Article 56 of Regulations No. 37 (revised January, 1921) is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Art. 56. Conditional bequests.—Where the bequest, legacy, devise, or
gift is dependent upon the performance of some act, or the happening of
some event, in order to become effective, it is necessary that the perform
ance of the act or the occurrence of the event shall have taken place
before the deduction can be allowed. Where the legatee, devisee, donee,
or trustee is empowered to divert the property or fund, in whole or in
part, to a use or purpose which would have rendered it, to the extent
that it is subject to such power, not deductible had it been directly so
bequeathed, devised, or given by the decedent, deduction will be limited to
that portion, if any, of the property or fund which is exempt from an
exercise of such power.

Patterson, Teele & Dennis announce the opening of a branch office
at 1319 F. street, N.W., Washington, D. C., under the management of
Frank Lowson, John W. Dawson and Robert Kemp Slaughter as resident
partners.
W. P. Hilton & Company announce that their Chicago office, in Harris
Trust building, will be conducted by Hilton, Mahon & Knowles, a partner
ship consisting of W. P. Hilton, George Mahon, D. E. Knowles and
B. F. Dvorak.
Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co. announce the opening of offices in the
Callahan Bank building, Dayton, Ohio.
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